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Russian Grand Strategy and how to handle it  
Marc Franco 
In many Western chancelleries, there still is a 
lot of hesitation and bewilderment on how to 
deal with Russia. A first step in defining a 
coherent policy vis-a-vis Russia, is trying to 
understand the motivation and objectives of 
Russian foreign policy, as well as its 
weaknesses. 
 
Churchill’s famous phrase on an enigmatic Russia 
is often quoted when discussing relations with 
Moscow, and its allegedly unpredictable 
behaviour as a foreign policy actor. In fact, Russia 
is not so mysterious as it seems at first sight. But 
a better understanding requires that we leave our 
own way of framing reality behind, and try to 
understand the Russian leaders’ world view and 
their perception of their interests (which is largely 
shared by Russian citizens).  
 
At present, the relations between Russia and the 
West (the EU as well as the US) are in bad shape, 
with little perspective of improvement. The 2014 
Ukraine crisis is often quoted as the breaking 
point, which it certainly was, but the deterioration 
of relations started much earlier. One may even 
ask whether relations have ever genuinely been 
“good”. This paper will describe the evolution of 
the Russian thinking on foreign policy, analyse 
how the concept is being implemented, and 
assess how foreign policy hangs together with the 
domestic situation in Russia, before concluding  
with some perspectives on how the West could 
respond to Russian foreign policy. 
 
RUSSIA’S EVOLVING FOREIGN POLICY 
CONCEPT  
The years 1989-1991 saw the downfall of 
Communism, the dissolution of Comecon and 
the Warsaw Pact, and the end of the Soviet Union 
and thus of the bi-polar Cold War era. The spirit 
of the new era was laid down in the Paris Charter 
of 1990, the founding act of the OSCE. The 
Charter stipulated that future cooperation 
between former Communist countries and the 
West would be based on market economic 
principles, parliamentary democracy, and respect 
for human rights. In the chaotic years of the first 
half of the 1990s, Russia was mostly preoccupied 
with its internal problems: the liquidation of the 
old Communist Party-dominated governance 
structure, the breakdown of the planned 
economy, and the changeover from public to 









Focussing on the formidable challenges of its 
internal transformation, it looked as if on the 
international scene Russia was accepting the 
reality of the unipolar global order and was 
effectively taking up its place in the (Western) 
international community – the only one left – 
dominated by the US. However, below the 
surface there were already indications that Russia 
was not terribly comfortable with this 
subordinate role. When in 1995 Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev was replaced with the veteran foreign 
policy expert Primakov, the change in tone and 
emphasis announced the future development of 
Russian foreign policy The Primakov Doctrine 
holds that Russia is a sovereign actor in global 
politics and pursues an independent foreign 
policy. Within this concept, Russia’s foreign 
policy is based on respect for international law 
and inspired by a multilateral approach. Russia is 
opposed to an eastward expansion of NATO and 
intends to enforce it primacy in the post-Soviet 
space and in Eurasia. This includes a partnership 
with China.  
 
The change in approach between Kozyrev, 
faithful to the Paris Charter and accepting the 
unipolar world order, and Primakov, aiming at 
making Russia a regional and global power again, 
explains the increasingly difficult relations 
between Russia and the West. For those that had 
any doubts, Putin’s speech at the 2007 München 
Security Conference spelled out clearly that 
Moscow rejects the post-Cold War US-
dominated international order. The Munich 
speech marked the end of Russia’s deference 
towards the Western powers. Putin claimed the 
right to defend Russia’s own interests and stated 
its own (great power) ambitions. He expressed 
his displeasure with the US-dominated 
international order, attacked the existing 
European security architecture, denounced 
NATO expansion, and accused the US of global 
destabilisation and disdain for international law. 
He described the liberal international order as a 
projection of the US’ will to dominate the world. 
With some variations in emphasis, this is the line 
that can be found in the November 2016 Foreign 
Policy Concept and the December 2015 National 
Security Concept of the Russian Federation. 
Other useful references are Putin's speech after 
the annexation of Crimea in Marche 2014 and his 
speech at the Valdai conference in October 2014.  
 
Russa’s foreign policy concept reflects a 
genuinely “realist” approach to foreign policy: 
great power interactions are not determined by 
moral principles or moral commitments, but by 
considerations of interest and power. 
 
FOREIGN POLICY IN PRACTICE 
The aims of the Russian foreign policy concept 
are not secret, therefore; likewise, the way this 
concept is to be put into practice has been made 
abundantly clear for all to see. The foreign policy 
concept is implemented through all instruments 
at Russia’s disposal: economic (“energy as a 
weapon”), political (interference in western 
democratic processes), and military (Georgia, 
Ukraine). This Russian concept of “hybrid 
warfare” has even been publicised by Chief of 
Staff Valery Gerasimov in his 2013 article The 
Value of Science Is in the Foresight, in which he 
states: “The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The 
role of nonmilitary means of achieving political 
and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, 
they have exceeded the power of force of 
weapons in their effectiveness. All this is 
supplemented by military means of a concealed 
character”. The Kremlin’s reliance on proxies, 
disinformation, and measures short of war are 
not distinct and separate from its military 
interventions, and only partially serve as a 
substitute for hard power. Russian military and 









The Gerasimov doctrine is not a concept of grand 
strategy, but the development of an operational 
concept for Russia’s confrontation with the West in 
support of the actual doctrine that has guided Russian 
policy for over two decades: the Primakov Doctrine. 
In Russia’s grand strategy, the countries of the former 
Soviet Union are targeted as Russia’s priority sphere 
of influence. The Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) plays a prominent role in Russia’s foreign 
policy. The development of bilateral and multilateral 
relations in the CIS was the major thrust of Russian 
foreign policy after the breakdown of the Soviet 
Union. Russia had to reluctantly accept that the 
European ex-Comecon countries and three former 
Soviet Republics slipped out of the Russian sphere of 
influence and joined the EU and/or NATO. As far as 
the other former Soviet Republics in Asia and Europe 
is concerned, political, economic, social, and cultural 
links bind these countries to Russia, which considers 
them either as a hinterland or as buffer states 
protecting Russia from possible invasions. Because of 
its size and the length of its borders, Russia has several 
vulnerable flanks: the Baltics/Nordics, East Central 
Europe, South East Europe, the South Caucasus, 
Central Asia. Foreign invasion is a real (or fake) 
preoccupation of the Russian leadership, and this calls 
for security arrangements on each of these flanks.  
 
The two priority regions for Russia’s foreign policy 
happen to overlap with the neighbourhood of the 
EU, which is the priority focus for EU foreign policy 
according to Article 8 of the Treaty on European 
Union.  
 
In the first place, Russia’s European “near abroad” 
coincides with the EU’s “neighbourhood”. In 2004, 
the launching of the European Neighbourhood 
policy was looked upon unfavourably by Russia, 
which refused to enter that framework. The creation 
of the Eastern Partnership in 2009 was considered an 
outright anti-Russian gesture, and perceived as the EU 
seeking to consolidate the extension of its sphere of 
influence at the expense of Russia. The result of the 
competition in the neighbourhood/near abroad is 
bleak:  of the 6 countries of the Eastern Partnership, 
five (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan) have territorial conflicts, directly or 
indirectly linked to Russia. The sixth country (Belarus) 
is the scene a of popular revolt against the “last 
dictator in Europe”.  Russia pursues its interests using 
all the tricks in the book. Overt as well as covert 
interventions are intended to obstruct further 
rapprochement with the EU and, a fortiori, NATO. 
The Central Asian part of the Russian near abroad, is 
of less direct interest to the EU but is a of direct 
importance to China – but that is another story.  
 
A second region in Europe where Russia tries to re-
establish its influence are the successor states of 
Yugoslavia on the Balkans. The 1999 Stability and 
Association Process offered the countries of the 
western Balkans the perspective of EU, and possibly 
NATO, membership. No surprise that Russia tries to 
block this and seeks to lure these countries away from 
the EU: witness the coup attempt in Montenegro in 
summer 2018, the interference in the referendum on 
the name change in North Macedonia, the developing 
cooperation with Serbia (military cooperation, Free 
Trade Agreement, etc.), among other interventions.  
 
Apart from these focal regions for Russia’s grand 
strategy, Russia actively pursues a policy of “strategic 
opportunism” in other parts of the world: utilising 
every opportunity of conflict or tension with the West 
to propose various types of closer cooperation, and 
thus tempt countries to abandon their partnerships 
with the West. New relations with Turkey and 
Egypt, and the operations in Libya, were 
launched when relations with the West were at a 
low eb or perturbed. In the case of Egypt, the 
West’s hesitation to recognize and fully support 
the 2013 coup by Abdel Fattah el Sisi created an 
opportunity for Russia to conclude a series of 
economic as well as security agreements. In the 
case of Turkey, the West’s lukewarm reaction 
after the failed 2016 coup d’état against Erdogan, 
 
 





and the US’ refusal to extradite Fethullah Güllen, 
allowed Russia to strengthen energy as well as 
military cooperation with Turkey, thus to some 
extent luring a NATO member out of the 
alliance. Russia has also established good 
relations with all countries in the MENA region, 
even the enemies of its allies or the allies of its 
enemies (e.g. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates), and countries in conflict (Israel and 
Palestine, Morocco and Algeria). The relations 
with Syria are more complex. Support for Assad 
is not only support for a traditional ally. It also 
makes Russia an essential player in the region: 
part of the problem, and therefore necessarily 
part of the solution. The importance of the 
Mediterranean naval base in Tartus and the 
Khmeimim Air Base may be a more important 
consideration than the defence of the Assad 
regime as such.  
 
As Moscow strongly believes (or professes to 
believe) that the aim of the West (the US and 
NATO in particular) is to weaken Russia, it 
endeavours to weaken the West, to break 
alliances, and to weaken countries by interfering 
in elections, spreading fake news through 
television stations (Russia Today) or the internet 
(Sputnik), etc. Not only the US, but various 
European countries have been at the receiving 
end of Russian interference as well.  
 
The Primakov Doctrine, the 2007 Munich 
speech, and other Russian policy statements all 
point in the same direction: the establishment of 
Russia as a regional and global power, and 
Russian primacy in the post-soviet space. To 
contest the US-dominated international order, an 
alternative international sphere is to be created. 
The importance of the CIS was already 
mentioned, but the Russian initiative to re-create 
economic and political links with the CIS 
countries has been only partially successful, and 
resulted in partial groupings with an economic or 
security focus. Russia’s “Asia pivot” is part of this 
strategy; so is Russia’s engagement with the 
BRICS countries, and the various international 
arrangements it has launched or supported: the 
Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation, the Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation, etc. The key player 
in the CSO is, of course, China; the convergence 
of Russia’s geopolitical and China’s geo-
economic objectives is of crucial importance for 
the success of this strategy. The Sino-Russian 
alliance is not without its own problems, 
however, as the interests of Russia and China do 
diverge occasionally (e.g. in Central Asia), and 
because a too dominant China will be as difficult 
to accept by Moscow as a dominant US. 
 
 
To be fair: hybrid warfare and zones of influence 
are not Russian inventions. Western powers have 
also indulged (and still indulge) in this kind of 
operations. The classic Russian response to 
criticism of its various forms of aggressive 
behaviour is a reference to (allegedly) similar 
Western actions: “what about-ism”. The Russian 
narrative about its own aggressive initiatives seeks 
to expose “Western hypocrisy” by referring to 
Western precedents. Russian action is supposedly 
only “mirroring” Western disregard for 
international law:  
• The recognition of Kosovo (a “terrifying 
precedent” in Putin’s words) is used as 
justification for the intervention in (and 
recognition of) South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  
• The same precedent is referred to for the 
annexation of the Crimea, invoking “protection 
of human rights” as further justification.  
• If NATO can intervene in the Balkans, 
and the US in Iraq, without a UNSC resolution; 
if a Western coalition of the willing can transgress 
the UNSC resolution and force regime change on 
Libya – why can Russia not intervene in the same 
manner in Syria, Georgia, Ukraine?  
 
 





Although “what about-ism” is not a valid reply to 
Western criticism of Russian aggression and non-
respect of international law, there often is an 
element of truth in it. Perhaps refocussing on 
respect for international law could put Western 
foreign policy on a more solid and credible basis, 
thus reinforcing the legitimacy of Western 
criticism of Russian aggression.  
 
 
THE ECONOMIC AND DOMESTIC 
BACKGROUND OF FOREIGN POLICY  
Russia’s foreign policy ambitions are conditioned 
by its (economic) capacity. Russia’s real 
importance lies in its military strength and its 
place as one of the world’s two main nuclear 
powers. It is questionable how real this strength 
is. From the point of view of military 
expenditure, Russia plays only a secondary role: 
estimated at $70 billion, Russia’s military budget 
is just over 10% of the US budget, and 25% of 
the total military outlays of the EU member 
states. Is outward aggressivity perhaps a way to 
hide underlying weaknesses? 
 
This question becomes even more pertinent if the 
economic background is considered. A 
problematic demography, a stagnating economy, 
a nominal GDP the size of the Benelux, and a 
notorious overdependence on the export of 
hydrocarbons are important obstacles, 
hampering the implementation of an ambitious 
policy. Instead of diversifying, it turns out that in 
the years 2010-2018 Russia has become even 
more dependent on hydrocarbons. The share of 
oil and gas production in the Russian economy 
increased from 34.3% to 38.9%. Oil and gas 
account for ¾ of Russian exports and 50% of the 
government budget. Russia failed the challenge of 
modernising and diversifying its economy. With 
less than brilliant perspectives for hydrocarbons 
in the world economy, prospects for the Russian 
economy are rather problematic. 
Let us be clear: Russia is far from bankrupt. It has 
hardly any foreign debt (total foreign debt is 30% 
of GDP), public debt is low (15% of GDP), the 
deficit on the budget is below 3%, unemployment 
is around 6%, and inflation around 4% – all these 
are pre-COVID figures, of course. But Russia’s 
growth figures over the last years have been 
disappointing. All by all, an economy the size of 
the Benelux (or Italy) is hardly a solid basis for an 
ambitious foreign policy backed up by an 
oversized military complex. Naked statistics do 
not tell the full story, as the nuclear capacity of 
Russia and the high-tech nature of some of its 
armaments, as well as Russia’s readiness to use 
aggressive policies have to be taken into account 
in assessing Russia’s weight on the international 
scene. It is nevertheless obvious that Russia 
overplays its hand in the name of great power 
status and geopolitics. 
 
Geopolitics is also linked with Russian domestic 
politics. Not only the leadership, but the Russian 
people consider that Russia is a great power that 
must play its role on the world stage. During the 
chaotic 1990s the loss of great power status was 
as great a blow for the national pride of the 
average Russian as the economic catastrophe 
resulting from the collapse of the plan economy. 
With the restauration of law and order and the 
help of high oil prices, the early Putin years saw 
not only an economic revival but also a return to 
the world stage – initially along the lines laid out 
by the West, but rapidly shifting to its own path. 
For Russians, the return to the world scene, the 
improvement in living standards, and the 
establishment of an authoritarian regime were 
constituent parts of the “social contract” between 
the President and the Russian population. To the 
extent that the modernisation and diversification 
of the economy has not been terribly successful 
and standards of living are no longer improving, 
the only justification for maintaining the 
(increasingly) authoritarian nature of the of the 
 
 





regime is Russia’s role as a great power. The 
annexation of the Crimea – and to a lesser extent 
the intervention in East Ukraine – constituted a 
great boon for the popularity of the President. 
Public support for the President and for his party, 
United Russia, has since been diminishing, 
however, because of the stagnant economy, 
corruption, and the incompetence of the 
leadership. This recalls the situation in the 1980s 
when Gorbachov stressed the need for 
perestroika and glasnost. 
 
Putin’s strength (in leadership circles and the 
population at large) is that there is no identifiable 
alternative. The only credible opposition show in 
town is Navalny’s anticorruption campaign. 
Despite official boycotts and electoral fraud, in 
the recent elections Navalny’s supporters got 
elected in several local councils, and United 
Russia lost the majority in 2 out of 18 councils. 
Support for the regime by the intelligentsia and 
part of the middle class has shrunk, and the 
oligarchs are no longer confident that present 
policies serve their best interest. Opposition 
movements are developing in the regions, witness 
the continuing opposition against the change of 
governor in Khabarovsk, but also the 
demonstrations against the refusal of opposition 
candidates for elections in the Moscow region. 
The demonstrations against the fraudulent 
election in 2011-2012 and last year’s 
demonstration of young people all over the 
country have been skilfully neutralized by the 
regime, but the spirit is not forgotten. According 
to the Levada opinion polling organisation, 2/3 
of the Russians are aware of these protest 
movements, and most Russians do not believe 
that they are organised with Western support. 
 
Putin’s power base is gradually eroding and has 
to be shored up by increasingly authoritarian 
interventions and foreign policy successes (most 
recently: the Nagorno Karabakh arrangement). 
To be clear, Putin is still solidly in the driving seat. 
Since the Constitutional amendment he no longer 
is a lame duck, and he seems to enjoy the full 
support of the security establishment and the 
army. Several opposition actions, (in particular 
led by Navalny) have dented his standing (and 
that of United Russia), but regime change is likely 
not for tomorrow. 
 
 OPTIONS FOR EU FOREIGN POLICY  
 Russia pursues an aggressive foreign policy to re-
establish its place as a global player on par with 
the US, it defends its “sphere of influence” in its 
near abroad, it aims to weaken the West, and to 
set up an alternative international community, in 
alliance with China and other emerging countries. 
However, Russia’s weakness lies in its domestic 
base.  
 
This linkage between foreign and domestic policy 
makes it improbable that Russian foreign policy 
will change anytime soon. Moreover, 
speculations on new opportunities that might 
potentially arise in a post-Putin era are a rather 
useless exercise, since it is impossible to foresee 
when Putin will hand over power and who will be 
the successor.  Even if, by a trick of political 
magic, Putin is replaced by the most credible 
candidate from outside the establishment, 
Navalny, it is unlikely that he would give up 
Russia’s nationalist foreign policy agenda. Indeed, a 
quick background check on Navalny reveals that this 
fighter for democracy and against corruption is also a 
dyed in the wool nationalist. E.g. it is improbable that 
Navalny – or any other opposition figure in a 
hypothetical position of power – would undo the 
annexation of Crimea.  
 
Keeping this in mind, what could be the response of 
the EU, Western diplomacy in general, to Russia’s 
stance on the international scene? Theoretically, three 









One option, that could be called “passive 
containment”, would be to consolidate the status quo, 
and to turn existing EU policy into a more consciously 
strong policy. This could be considered an updated 
version of the Cold War. Relations with Russia would 
not be allowed to develop further – which would 
require dampening the enthusiasm of the private 
sector to seize economic opportunities in Russia. As a 
consequence, Russia would likely attempt to 
strengthen its relations with its allies, notably China 
and the other BRICS countries, and with its near 
abroad. Like in the Cold War period, in parallel to an 
international community based on the market 
economy and liberal democracy under US leadership, 
a second international community could develop, 
based on illiberal democracy and state capitalism, 
especially if relations between the US and China 
would worsen at the same time. It would be unlikely 
that the EU would have developed sufficient 
“strategic autonomy” to distance itself from a US 
strategy that treats Russia and China as strategic 
competitors. The longer the stand-off would last, the 
larger the gap between Russia and the West, and the 
more complicated it would be to bridge that gap 
eventually, implying a loss of cooperation 
opportunities. The success of “passive containment” 
relies on the assumption that a new “Gorbachov 
moment” is due to happen in the end: improvement 
of relations would depend on an eventual change in 
Russia’s internal and external policies, but it is 
uncertain how and when this would occur.  
 
A second, more proactive option, could be called 
“active containment”: Western diplomacy would 
adopt a more aggressive stance and would more 
vigorously contest Russian policies. This would mean 
intensifying relations with countries in Russia’s 
“sphere of influence”, re-launching the NATO 
membership of Georgia and Ukraine, positioning 
NATO troops in Russia’s neighbourhood, etc.  This 
would be a more aggressive “Cold War 2.0” and carry 
the risk of the situation getting out of hand. “Active 
containment” would also imply a more forceful 
response: the West would aim to counterattack in 
reaction to acts of aggression (e.g. cyber-attacks). It 
would be essential, therefore, to ensure that the West 
would be in a position of strength and muster the 
political will to assume the consequences of its more 
aggressive policy, in the military and well as in the 
economic sphere. “Active containment” assumes a 
“Cuban missile crisis moment”. It counts on Russia 
recognising and respecting the more forceful Western 
approach and, eventually, agreeing to sit around the 
table to negotiate a mutually satisfactory balance of 
power.  
 
A third, more prudent option, could be called 
“gradual synchronized relaxation”: Western 
diplomacy would actively explore how and to what 
extent the status of Russia as a regional and global 
power could be recognised. This would imply the 
recognition of Russia’s “legitimate interests”, 
particularly in its near abroad. This would be a delicate 
exercise: looking for openings to improve relations, 
and exploring overlapping zones of interest in the 
neighbourhood/near abroad, and how these could be 
managed. “Gradual synchronized relaxation” 
assumes that Russia would realise that its Asian 
pivot is not bringing the necessary modernisation 
and diversification of is economy, and that only 
cooperation with the West can bring about the 
necessary development. This re-conciliation 
would require imaginative proposals, openness to 
collaboration, and skilful brinkmanship on both sides. 
Above all, it would require Russia to give up its zero-
sum game approach to foreign policy, and 
demonstrate a willingness to make significant 
gestures. A possible approach for the 
neighbourhood/near abroad could be for Russia and 
the EU to concentrate on (economic) interests that 
can be shared, and to refrain from seeking (political) 
influence that is naturally divisive 
 
CONCLUSION 
All three option require solid unity among the EU 
Member States and between the EU and the US.  
 
 





Brussels and Washington have different perspectives 
on Russia, however. The US is interested in global 
relations, and focusses on the military threats. Europe 
is primarily interested in regional relations, and 
economic and trade relations. There are sufficient 
overlapping areas of interest, though, to allow for a 
coherent transatlantic policy to emerge, as the new 
Biden administration takes office. It would certainly 
be in everybody’s interest (and in the EU’s interest in 
the first place) if the important components of the 
security infrastructure that have been dismantled (the 
INF Treaty, New START, etc.) could be re-
negotiated and re-established 
 
For the EU, perennating the present immobilism and 
maintaining a “wait and see” attitude is not an option; 
it will further erode the credibility of the EU as a player 
on the regional and international scene.  First and 
foremost, the EU has to tackle the present ambiguity 
of Member States’ positions vis-à-vis Russia, and 
clearly define what the common interests of the 
Member States are. The current lack of any proactive 
policy leaves the initiative to Russia and condemns the 
EU to stay in a reactive mode. In the meantime, the 
gap between the EU and Russia becomes ever wider, 
while Russia aims to get closer to the BRICS 




apart of the EU and its large neighbour is a costly 
affair in terms of missed opportunities, political as well 
as economic. The unintended secondary effect 
(unintended also for Russia) of this Western policy 
may well be the reinforcement of China (with Russian 
support) as the main economic and geopolitical 
player. This eventuality calls for a thorough analysis of 
whether it is in the EU’s interest to associating itself 
completely with the US position on Russia and China. 
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